Why did former Syrian President Bashar Assad give up power?

Sunday, December 8, 2024, became a turning point in the history of Syria. After 54 years of Baath Party and Assad family rule over the politics of and the historical land of “the Levant”, terrorists succeeded in just 10 days to put an end to the rule of the London-educated ophthalmologist after conquering Aleppo, Hama, Homs, Daraa and finally Damascus. With the fall of Damascus, all government and military centers came under the terrorists’ control. The Syrian Prime Minister promised to hold free elections to determine the constitution and future ruler of Syria in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 2254.

According to the Russian state-run TASS news agency, Bashar al-Assad and his family had arrived in Moscow on Sunday and received political asylum from Russia. Israeli army chief Herzi Halevi, who saw the conditions ripe for spreading the war to Syria, officially announced that the Zionist regime would begin its attack on southern Syria. Now the questions that appear to mind are: how the armed opposition was able to move towards the capital with no resistance from the army or the Syrian people and overrun the country’s capital with a fight? Why didn’t history repeat itself and Assad fail to remain in power this time unlike in 2011?

Why didn’t Assad ask the Resistance for help?

Amid the movements of the Syrian opposition in Idlib province and the chaotic situation of the Syrian army on various fronts, a group of Iranian military advisors paid a visit to Damascus to warn about the ongoing developments in the Arab country last month. Information obtained from security agencies indicated that the terrorists present in Idlib had begun unprecedented movements to train forces and equip them with various types of offensive and defensive weapons. The Iranian military advisory units, who were alarmed by the terrorist movements in Idlib, needed President Assad’s green light to take action to revive and make the resistance military units in the vicinity of Idlib province more prepared.

During the trip by the delegation of the Iranian commanders to Syria, what became increasingly clear to them was the growing public dissatisfaction with the Syrian government due to the lack of infrastructure reconstruction and amassed economic problems. In recent months, the people of Suwayda province, who had historically supported the Assad government, had staged widespread protests due to the spread of famine, the lack of proper public services, and the devaluation of the local currency, the Syrian Pound or Lira. Similar dissatisfaction and protests could be seen in other parts of Syria. Knowing that the Iranian officials, who were Syria’s “true ally”, tried to explain the challenges facing the Syrian government in different fields of military, economic, and public opinion to urge for tackling them as a necessity.

Getting away from Resistance and being deceived by new friends

Unfortunately, Bashar al-Assad, in response to the goodwill of his Iranian friends, officially announced that no action was possible to resolve the above-mentioned challenges. He also claimed that the terrorists were not capable of engaging in a large-scale war and would fight each other if a military move were to begin. This incorrect analysis was more of an excuse to reduce Iran’s role in developments in the Levant than a result of intelligence or trust in the domestic front. Previously, Assad, at the request of Arab countries, had asked many of Iran’s old commanders to end their mission in the country.

Assad’s change of tone and his disregard for Iran’s warnings signaled the empty promises of other actors active in Syria. In order to solve severe economic problems and rebuild the damage caused by the civil war, the Syrian government had decided to gradually get away from Iran and turn towards the United States and its regional allies, namely conservative Sunni countries. Apparently, in the early days of the terrorists’ movement towards Aleppo province, promises of assistance to the Assad government were made by some countries, but none of them were fulfilled by December 8th.

Reuters reported on December 2, that the US and the United Arab Emirates had discussed with each other the possibility of lifting sanctions on Syrian President Bashar al-Assad if he peels himself away from Iran and cuts off weapons routes to Lebanon’s Hezbollah. The Americans were trying to cajole Assad that Caesar sanctions would not be extended on December 20 and would receive economic assistance. They did not hold on to their promise and Assad government finally collapsed.

With the beginning of the movement of the terrorists’ war machine from the fourth de-escalation zone, Idlib, in spite of all mentioned above, the Islamic Republic of Iran initiated high-level contacts with Bashar al-Assad and expressed Tehran’s readiness to fully support Damascus. In response to Iran’s generous offer, Assad made it clear to Tehran that he had no control over the battlefields against the armed opposition and told the Iranian side that it was up to them to bring their forces into the Syrian war. In other words, instead of sending an official request for help from Iranian officials, the legitimate president of Syria decided to consider significant proposals from his new friends. As time passed the decision proved to be wrong and there was no time to revise it.

Despite the fact that Assad shrugged in reply to Iran’s warnings, the Iranian armed forces remained on alert and were supposed to move towards the battlefronts from Damascus after receiving the “green light”. In the last hours, Assad was contacted and (perhaps) for the last time, Iran’s full readiness to enter the Syrian battlefield and change the equation in favor of Damascus was spoken of. Ultimately, Bashar Assad’s lack of readiness, his army’s poor performance, and widespread people’s dissatisfaction with his government led to the conclusion that, despite the “chance of success,” Iranian officials, after hours of consultation on developments in Syria, concluded that this time the conditions for Iran’s military assistance to Bashar Assad were not laid.

Conclusion

With Syria (temporarily) out of the Resistance Axis, the connection between the different sides of the Resistance Front has faced uncertainty. This becomes especially relevant given the significance of the link to Hezbollah’s mujahideen. The fast pace of the current developments in the region and the coordination between the US, Israel and their conservative Sunni countries showed years of planning to change the geography and demography of northern Gaza and change the “balance of power” in favor of the Hebrew-Arab-Western Axis. However, the “game” is not over yet! The history of Islam is full of ups and downs and had the following message for the Resistance Mujahideen: if the believers learn from the “Uhud Battle”, the conquest of “Khaybar” will follow.

MNA